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ABSTRACT
A controversy involving loan loss provisions in banks concerns their relationship with the business cycle. While international 
accounting standards for recognizing provisions (incurred loss model) would presumably be pro-cyclical, accentuating the 
e ects of the current economic cycle, an alternative model, the expected loss model, has countercyclical characteristics, acting 
as a bu er against economic imbalances caused by expansionary or contractionary phases in the economy. In Brazil, a mixed 
accounting model exists, whose behavior is not known to be pro-cyclical or countercyclical.  e aim of this research is to analyze 
the behavior of these accounting models in relation to the business cycle, using an econometric model consisting of  nancial 
and macroeconomic variables.  e study allowed us to identify the impact of credit risk behavior, earnings management, 
capital management, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) behavior, and the behavior of the unemployment rate on provisions in 
countries that use di erent accounting models. Data from commercial banks in the United Kingdom (incurred loss), in Spain 
(expected loss), and in Brazil (mixed model) were used, covering the period from 2001 to 2012. Despite the accounting models 
of the three countries being formed by very di erent rules regarding possible e ects on the business cycles, the results revealed 
a pro-cyclical behavior of provisions in each country, indicating that when GDP grows, provisions tend to fall and vice versa. 
 e results also revealed other factors in uencing the behavior of loan loss provisions, such as earning management.
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1. INTRODUCTION
According to Longbrake and Rossi (2011), many of 
the rules that regulate the  nancial markets contributed 
to deepening the crisis that a ected the global economy 
in the period between 2007 and 2009, fueling the debate 
regarding the way the  nancial system accentuates the 
e ects of expansionary and contractionary phases in 
the economy. At the heart of the claim lies the concern 
regarding pro-cyclicality, which represents a positive 
correlation between a particular variable and economic 
activity (Bebczuk & Sangiácomo, 2010).
For Harrald and Sandal (2010), pro-cyclicality is 
the way that the banking system interacts with the real 
economy and accentuates the e ects of an economic 
cycle. It derives from incentives to accelerate lending 
in periods of economic expansion and to reduce such 
activity in times of crisis. 
According to Longbrake and Rossi (2011), the  nancial 
system should ideally dampen and not amplify business 
cycles. Pro-cyclicality becomes especially problematic 
when it accentuates the e ect of a fall in the economic 
cycle and worsens a crisis.  us, countercyclical rules, 
which reduce economic imbalances and the depth of 
business cycles, are welcome.
Also according to these authors, factors that explain 
the in uence of the  nancial system on the economic 
environment include the accounting rules that set loan loss 
provisions.  e expression “loan loss provision” (“provisão 
para créditos de liquidação duvidosa” in Portuguese) is the 
term used by the Brazilian Central Bank for the estimated 
losses from loans granted by  nancial institutions. In 
international accounting standards, this provision is 
represented by impairment losses derived from loans 
and receivables.
For Bikker and Metzemakers (2004), the provision 
leaves room for subjective judgment and allows for 
discretion when establishing levels considered as 
“adequate”. The study by these authors identified a 
direct relationship between the provision set by banks 
and economic cycles, revealing that income smoothing, 
capital management, and tax rules also determine the 
level of provision. 
Betancourt and Baril (2009) observe that at the 
beginning of a downward economic cycle there is little 
provision recognized in banks earnings. As the crisis 
worsens the provisions grow, deteriorating the equity 
situation of banks and reducing levels of lending when the 
market needs funds the most.  is pro-cyclical behavior 
is adopted by banks that follow international accounting 
standards for provisions.
 e accounting principles in the United States and 
those of the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB) adopt the incurred loss model, establishing that 
a loss in credit operations will only be recognized in 
earnings if its occurrence (related to a loss event) is likely 
and its value can be estimated with certainty.
According to Betancourt and Baril (2009), an 
alternative to the incurred loss model is the expected 
loss model, which recognizes provisions based on 
expected future losses, independently of objective 
evidence. This model uses as a reference the dynamic 
provision adopted by the Banco de España, which 
accepts the setting of a generic provision to protect 
banks against possible additional losses in a particular 
economic cycle.
In Brazil, Resolution n. 2,682/1999 of the National 
Monetary Council rules that the provision should be set 
based on the operation risk level and its value should be 
reviewed at least monthly, depending on the delay in the 
payment of principal or interest.  is involves a mixed 
system with characteristics of expected loss (provisions 
based on future losses expectations) and incurred loss 
(provisions based on objective evidence represented by 
delays in payment).
The three accounting models would cause different 
behaviors of the provision in relation to economic 
cycles. In order to confirm this assumption, the 
relationship between the accounting criteria for setting 
provisions in banks and economic cycles should be 
investigated.
Studies such as those by Bikker and Metzemakers 
(2004) and by Boutavier and Lepetit (2007) have already 
been conducted to investigate the relationship between 
loan loss provisions and economic cycles. Besides being 
restricted to certain aspects of the provision, these studies 
used relatively di erent models and variables, thus leaving 
room for new analyses on the topic.
 ere are few studies involving the Brazilian model, 
which is presumably countercyclical since most of 
the value of the provisions is the result of classifying 
operations by level of risk at the time of lending and 
not migration between the risk categories due to credit 
defaults.
 e aim is to analyze whether the accounting models 
involved in setting loan loss provisions in banks are pro-
cyclical, countercyclical, or acyclical, using an econometric 
model with a consistent theoretical framework and 
empirical construction.
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A panel data econometric model was specified in 
which the loan loss provision expense in relation to 
total assets is regressed against the variation in Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), under the control of the 
unemployment rate and accounting variables that affect 
the provision. An identical specification is run for 
samples from three different provision accounting 
systems (United Kingdom, Spain, and Brazil) with 
the aim of verifying whether the covariance between 
the provision and GDP is significantly positive 
(countercyclical), negative (pro-cyclical), or without 
significance (acyclical).
The results indicated a negative and significant 
association between the provision expense and GDP in the 
three countries, signaling that the empirically con rmed 
pro-cyclical behavior is independent of the provision 
model adopted. One probable assumption regarding 
this  nding is that the banks may be using discretion 
and engaging in earnings management via the provision 
and more than compensating for the expected e ect of 
the models, but this is a hypothesis to be investigated in 
future research.
Besides this introduction, this paper presents the 
literature review in section 2; section 3 formulates 
the three research hypotheses; section 4 details the 
methodology; section 5 presents, analyzes, and 
discusses the results; and section 6 offers some final 
remarks.
2. CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING ECONOMIC CYCLES AND PRO-CYCLICALITY
A classic de nition of “economic cycle”, or “business 
cycle”, is that of Burns and Mitchell (1946): 
Business cycles are a type of  uctuation found in the aggregate 
economic activity of nations that organize their work mainly in 
business enterprises: a cycle consists of expansions occurring 
at about the same time in many economic activities, followed 
by similarly general recessions, contractions, and revivals 
which merge into the expansion phase of the next cycle; in 
duration business cycles vary from more than one year to 
ten or twelve years.
For Harrald and Sandal (2010), pro-cyclicality is the 
way in which the banking system interacts with the real 
economy, accentuating the e ects of an economic cycle. 
 e pro-cyclicality cost depends on the extent to which the 
e ects of the cycle are accentuated and the fact that these 
e ects are damaging to the economy. Pro-cyclicality derives 
from incentives for the acceleration of lending in periods 
of expansion and the reduction in such activity in crises.
According to Bebczuk et al. (2010), pro-cyclicality is 
a synchronized movement in the growth of credit and 
production, both in time t. Excessive cyclicality in lending 
can lead to problems such as exacerbating the economic 
cycle, an increase in systemic risk, and the inadequate 
allocation of resources for loans.
For Gonzales (2009), pro-cyclicality is present when 
the actions of banks tend to reinforce the movements of 
the underlying business cycles, indicating a correlation 
between the aforementioned actions and the current 
economic environment. Pro-cyclical measures are, 
therefore, those that contribute to strengthening the 
current economic cycle.
3. LOAN LOSS PROVISIONS IN BANKS
Hendriksen and Van Breda (1999) state that an 
important element in evaluating receivables is the 
treatment of uncertainty with regards to their payment 
by the client.  us, revenue should be measured by the 
value that it is expected will be received. In the quality of 
the value reserve, the provision adjusts the gross value of 
loans according to their credit risk.  is adjustment has 
a direct e ect on the income calculation, a ecting the 
amount to be paid out to shareholders.
3.1. Provision Models
Banks’ provision rules can be: (i) backward-looking, 
based on losses incurred in operations and considering 
the events and conditions prior to the balance sheet; and 
(ii) forward-looking, set by considering expected losses 
and based on trend analyses (Bouvatier & Lepetit, 2012).
According to Cortavarria, Dziobek, Kanaya, and Song 
(2000), provisions can be generic and speci c. Generic 
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provisions are possible or latent losses not yet identi ed 
(ex-ante) and applicable to all operations. Specific 
provisions re ect individually identi ed losses related 
to an observable event (ex-post).
3.2. Earnings Management via Provisions
Accounting rules allow for the use of discretion 
and judgment in the  nancial statements preparation 
(Cohen & Zarowin, 2007).  is enables the use of business 
knowledge and expertise to choose the most appropriate 
accounting methods, estimates, and disclosure.  e 
problem is when managers  nd incentives to convey 
information to their own bene t, choosing accounting 
methods and accounting estimates that do not adequately 
re ect the underlying economic conditions.
For Cohen and Zarowin (2007), this accounting 
information discretion can be both a value maximizer and 
opportunistic, leaving room for “earnings management”. 
Earnings management can be achieved via the 
manipulation of accruals, which according to Martinez 
(2001, p. 29) represent “the di erence between net income 
and net cash  ow”, or via real transactions, such as a 
reduction in spending on research and development. 
In the case of provision, earnings management occurs 
through accruals manipulation. For Martinez (2001), 
when it is le  to managers to make accounting choices, 
they may not limit themselves to accounting facts alone 
and use exogenous variables, which will also in uence 
the decision.  us, provision will also consider aspects 
that extrapolate credit quality.
Studies have revealed indications of earnings 
management being practiced by  nancial institutions in 
Brazil, based on the use of loan loss provisions. Macedo 
and Kelly (2016) identi ed that from 2006 to 2012 the 
income level obtained by  nancial institutions in uenced 
these provisions. Bortoluzzo, Sheng, and Gomes (2016) 
found similar results by analyzing the behavior of 123 
Brazilian banks between 2001 and 2012. Silva (2016) 
showed that between June 2009 and December 2014 
Brazilian and Luso-Spanish banking institutions used 
provision expenses to manage earnings. Cursio and 
Hasan (2015) found that from 1996 to 2006 earnings 
management was shown to be an important determinant 
of the provisions of  nancial intermediaries that operate 
in the Euro zone. 
3.3. Capital Management via Provisions
In the capital management hypothesis, banks set higher 
provisions when their regulatory capital is relatively low. 
According to Bikker and Metzemakers (2004), this occurs 
because the Basel Accord allows for the accumulated 
provisions in the balance sheet, although limited to a 
percentage of risk-weighted assets, to comprise banks’ 
regulatory capital.  is allowance occurs only in relation 
to level 2 capital, which is the lowest quality regulatory 
capital and whose value cannot exceed the value of level 
1 capital, taken as main capital.
3.4. Studies Relating the Provision to Economic 
Cycles
Table 1 lists studies involving the pro-cyclicality of 
the provision in banks.
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Table 1 Summary of the main articles involving the analysis of the pro-cyclicality of the loan loss provision in  nancial institutions. 
Author/Period Methodology Results
Cavallo and Majnoni 
Period: 1988 to 1999
Publication: 2001
Estimation of an equation in which the provision 
is a function of: (i) speci c variables of the 
banks, (ii) macroeconomic variables, and (iii) 
institutional variables, with the use of three different 
techniques (OLS cross section, pooled cross 
section, and panel  xed effect estimation).
Strong evidence that the relationship between the 
provision and the earnings of banks from the G-10 
countries presents a positive sign. The same sign is 
negative for banks from countries outside the G-10, which 
on average present much smaller provisions in good 
periods and are forced to increase them in bad periods.
Bikker and Hu
Period: 1979 to 1999
Publication: 2002
To identify the relationship between the provision 
and the business cycle, three macroeconomic 
variables (real GPD growth, unemployment, and 
in ation) and three speci c variables of the banking 
sector (loans, net  nancial intermediation earnings, 
and defaults) were used as explanatory variables 
for the provision in the linear regression.
Increases in the provision depend a lot on the business 
cycle. In bad times, the provisions increase. Banks 
contribute signi cantly more to the provisions in 
years of relatively higher earnings (as a precaution 
or as a way of smoothing income), leading the 
sector to be less pro-cyclical than it should. 
Laeven and Majnoni
Período: 1988 to 1999
Publication: 2003
In the linear regression, the provisions are a result of 
the earnings before income tax and of the provisions 
for losses; of the real growth in loans; of the real 
growth in GDP per capita; and of the year dummies.
Many banks delay the recognition of provisions as 
much as possible, recording them when an economic 
contraction has just taken hold and thus increasing the 
impact of economic cycles on earnings and on capital.
Bikker and Metzemakers
Period: 1991 to 2001
Publication: 2004
Based on the models by Cavallo and Majnoni (2002) 
and by Laeven and Majnoni (2003), the authors 
worked with additional variables such as GDP 
growth and dummies for the countries. The use of the 
provision for capital management was also tested.
The provisions of banks are usually substantially greater in 
periods of lower GDP growth, re ecting the growing risk of 
their credit portfolios when the economic cycle changes and 
enters into a downturn. This effect is mitigated by an increase 
in the provision in periods of higher earnings and in those in 
which the growth in the volume of lending becomes greater.
Handorf and Zhu 
Period: 1990 to 2000
Publication: 2006
The model is based on the assumption that the 
provision (dependent variable) is a linear function of 
two variables: (i) the initial value of the accumulated 
provision, net of the falls or losses ex-post of the current 
period; and of management’s expectations in relation 
to future falls, based on current available information. 
There is a positive correlation between the provision and 
GDP. The empirical tests do not support the pro-cyclicality of 
the provision in banks. The results were different depending 
on the size of the institutions. Medium-sized banks tend 
to use information on projected losses when de ning the 
value of the provision (countercyclical attitude). Smaller 
banks and much bigger banks tend towards provision 
practices that consider current losses (pro-cyclical attitude).
Bouvatier and Lepetit
Period: 1992 to 2004
Publication: 2007
The model evaluates whether the evolution of the 
provision explains the changes in banks’ behavior in 
relation to lending during the economic cycle. The 
linear regression model estimated the discretionary 
and non-discretionary components of the provision. 
The authors introduced the lagged dependent variable 
as an explanatory variable, in order to consider 
a dynamic adjustment in the provision. Capital 
management, earnings management, and the signaling 
of equity robustness are also important variables. 
Setting provisions to cover expected future losses in 
loans (“non-discretionary provisions”) causes major 
 uctuations in credit. The non-discretionary component 
of the provision ampli es the credit cycle: in an economy 
rising phase, banks tend to underestimate credit risks, 
indicating the existence of greater incentives for the 
granting of new loans since the costs of lending are 
undervalued. Provisions with managerial purposes 
(discretionary provisions) do not produce the same effect. 
Glen and 
Mondrágon-Vélez
Period: 1996 and 2008
Publication: 2011
The effects of business cycles on the performance of 
banks’ loans portfolios in developing countries were 
analyzed using linear and non-linear models. The 
provision was the proxy for the portfolio’s performance. 
GDP and other macroeconomic variables were considered 
as explanatory variables. The interest rate on loans and 
a set of variables with the individual characteristics 
of the banks of each country were also considered.
While economic growth is the main driver in the 
performance of banks’ credit portfolios, the effects caused by 
the interest rates are second order. The relationship between 
the provisions and economic growth is highly linear only 
in economic conditions of extreme stress. Greater loss 
provisions are related to the private sector leverage level, 
to the bad quality of a loans portfolio, and to the absence 
of penetration and capitalization of the  nancial system. 
GDP = gross domestic product.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
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4. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
  e hypotheses to be tested in this study and 
formulated in an alternative form are:
H1: Provisions based on the incurred loss model present 
a negative relationship with the variables that represent 
economic activity, contributing towards enhancing 
possible contractions experienced by the economy, or 
towards amplifying the e ects of favorable economic 
cycles.  ey are pro-cyclical in nature.
H2: Provisions based on the expected loss model present 
a positive relationship with the variables that represent 
economic activity, preventing possible contractions in 
the economy from being enhanced, or the e ects of 
favorable economic cycles from being ampli ed.  ey 
are countercyclical in nature.
H3: Provisions based on the mixed model adopted in 
Brazil present a positive relationship with the variables 
that represent economic activity, preventing possible 
contractions experienced by the economy from being 
enhanced, or the e ects of favorable economic cycles 
from being ampli ed.  ey are countercyclical in nature.
5. METHODOLOGY
5.1. Presentation of the Model and Discussion 
of the Variables
A linear regression model was de ned to evaluate the 
relationship between the variables of interest in order to 
identify how the provisions are associated with the variables 
that characterize business cycles. Most of the studies relating 
provisions and economic cycles use this type of model, 
such as Cavallo and Majnoni (2001), Bikker and Hu (2002), 
Laeven and Majnoni (2003), Bikker and Metzemakers 
(2004), Handorf and Zhu (2006), Bouvatier and Lepetit 
(2007), and Glen and Mondragón-Vélez (2011). 
 e model is estimated using the panel data method. 
 e empirical tests use the model below, elaborated based 
on the aims and hypotheses of the research:
where:
PROVit= loan loss provision over banks’ average total 
assets i in time t.
ΔGDPt = real variation in GDP in time t.
UNEMPt= unemployment rate in time t.
EARit = earnings before income tax, pro t sharing, and 
loan loss provisions over banks’ average total assets i in 
time t.
ΔlnLOANit = variation in the loan balances of banks i 
in time t.
LOANit = balance of credit operations over total assets 
of banks i in time t.
NEit = equity over total assets of banks i in time t.
▪ SIZEit = size of banks i in time t.
The aim of the model is not to capture a possible 
cause and effect relationship between dependent 
variables and independent variables, but rather, to 
identify how the dependent variable behaves in relation 
to variations in each independent variable, especially 
the macroeconomic ones. 
Despite the accounting variables being endogenous, 
their inclusion in the model is warranted because the 
provision is in uenced by prominently accounting factors, 
such as receivables, earnings, and equity. Moreover, these 
variables work as control variables, helping to more 
adequately capture the relationship between the dependent 
and the independent variables, taken as critical to the 
study (GDP and unemployment rate).
 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃�� = 𝛽𝛽� + 𝛽𝛽�∆𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃� + 𝛽𝛽�𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃� + 𝛽𝛽�𝑈𝑈𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃�� 
+𝛽𝛽�∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈�� + 𝛽𝛽�𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈�� + 𝛽𝛽�𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈�� + 𝛽𝛽�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈���+𝜀𝜀�� 
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Most of the models that study the provision-economic 
cycle relationship use the provision as a dependent 
variable. In this study, it represents the net amount of 
provision expenses set in the period, obtained by the 
di erence between the set and the reverted provisions. 
 e independent variables can be classi ed into: (i) 
macroeconomic variables for the countries (real GDP 
growth and unemployment rate); (ii) accounting variables 
for the banks (earnings before income tax, pro t sharing, 
and loan loss provisions over average total assets, variation 
in loan balances, loan balances over total assets, and equity 
over total assets); and (iii) a control variable (bank size). 
 e real variation in GDP is a critical variable in 
the model and considered a more useful indicator for 
representing the business cycle. Its value represents the 
percentage variation in GDP at constant prices.
 e unemployment rate is another representative metric of 
the current phase of the economic cycle. In Brazil, it indicates 
the joblessness rate for 10-year-olds upwards, considering only 
the main metropolitan regions of the country.
 e earnings over total assets variable, which indicates 
a possible use of the provision for earnings management, is 
the result of dividing the value of earnings before income 
tax, pro t sharing, and loan loss provisions by the average 
value of total assets. 
 e growth in lending variable, which indicates the 
evolution of the banks’ credit risk, represents the variation 
in the balances of credit operations in real terms. In the 
Brazilian case, the de ator used was the General Market 
Price Index (IGPM). For Spain and the United Kingdom, 
the Consumer Price Index (CPI) was used.  e variation 
in the balances of loans was calculated by the di erence 
in the natural logarithms in the following way: ln(credit 
operationsit/IGPMit) – ln(credit operationsit-1/IGPMit-1).
 e loans over total assets variable considers the 
exposure of the banks to credit risks, indicating the relative 
size of the loans portfolio. It represents the division of the 
balance of receivables from credit operation accounts by 
the value of total assets.
 e equity over total assets variable, inserted into 
the model to indicate a possible use of the provision as 
a capital management tool, is the result of dividing net 
equity by total assets.
 e SIZEit variable, de ned as the natural logarithm 
of total assets, de ated by the IGPM or the CPI, aims to 
control the size e ects of the institutions. Larger banks, 
or those participating in conglomerates, are expected to 
set more robust provisions.
5.2. Summary of the Expected Results
Table 2 summarizes the expected results in relation 
to the behavior and to the sign of the coe  cients of the 
explanatory variables, based on the formulated hypotheses.
Table 2 Summary of the expected results in relation to the model explanatory variables.
Variable Expected Behavior Sign
GDP Growth
In countries with provision accounting procedures that are considered 
pro-cyclical, such as the United Kingdom, a positive variation in 
GDP should make the level of the banks’ provision decrease.
-
In countries with provision accounting criteria that are considered 
countercyclical, such as Spain, a positive variation in GDP 
should make the level of the banks’ provision increase.
+
In Brazil, a country with provision accounting criteria that is considered 
mixed, a positive variation in GDP should make the level of the banks’ 
provision increase, considering the prevalence of ex-post criteria over ex-
ante criteria, which presupposes a prevalently countercyclical nature.
+
Unemployment rate
In countries with pro-cyclical provision accounting criteria such 
as the United Kingdom, a positive variation in unemployment 
should make the level of the banks’ provision increase. 
+
In countries with countercyclical provision accounting 
criteria, such as Spain, a positive variation in unemployment 
should make the level of banks’ provision decrease.
-
In Brazil, a country with provision accounting criteria that is considered 
mixed, a positive variation in the unemployment rate should make the level 
of the banks’ provision decrease, given the prevalence of ex-post criteria over 
ex-ante criteria, which presupposes a prevalently countercyclical nature.
-
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5.3. Tests Applied and Robustness Procedures 
Adopted
 e Im, Pesaran, and Shin – I.P.S, ADF-Fisher, and 
PP-Fisher unitary root tests indicated that in the countries 
studied the risk of a spurious regression was removed. 
 e Pearson correlation matrix (tables 3, 4, and 5) proved 
that a high correlation (above 0.8) did not exist between the 
independent variables in the countries analyzed.
Table 3 Pearson Correlation Matrix – Brazil.
LOAN ∆lnLOAN EAR NE ∆GDP UNEMP SIZE
LOAN 1.000000 - - - - - -
∆lnLOAN 0.095587 1.000000 - - - - -
EAR 0.233714 0.024260 1.000000 - - - -
NE -0.147020 -0.051504 0.139431 1.000000 - - -
∆GDP -0.011816 0.007476 0.025810 0.017003 1.000000 - -
UNEMP -0.057126 0.039506 0.120247 0.045110 0.040903 1.000000 -
SIZE -0.097314 0.005905 -0.107682 -0.592854 -0.009121 -0.234355 1.000000
LOAN = share of credit operations in the total assets of Brazilian banks; ∆lnLOAN = variation in the balances of credit operations of banks i 
in time t; EAR = share of earnings before income tax, pro t sharing, and loan loss provisions over average total assets of the Brazilian banks; 
NE = equity over total assets of banks i in time t; ∆GDP = real growth in gross domestic product in time t; UNEMP = unemployment rate in 
time t; SIZE = size of the commercial bank, represented by the natural logarithm of total assets de ated by the general market price index.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Table 4 Pearson correlation matrix – Spain.
LOAN ∆lnLOAN EAR NE ∆GDP UNEMP SIZE
LOAN  1.000000 - - - - - -
∆lnLOAN 0.179954  1.000000 - - - - -
EAR -0.088175 0.062070  1.000000 - - - -
NE -0.113306 -0.026035  0.241673  1.000000 - - -
∆GDP  0.121625 0.119785  0.082047 0.004057  1.000000 - -
UNEMP  -0.191935 -0.091091 -0.126566 0.003399 -0.739170  1.000000 -
SIZE -0.062023 0.011395 -0.070449 -0.646019 -0.070423 0.059811 1.000000
LOAN = share of credit operations in the total assets of Brazilian banks; ∆lnLOAN = variation in the balances of credit operations of banks i 
in time t; EAR = share of earnings before income tax, pro t sharing, and loan loss provisions over average total assets of the Brazilian banks; 
NE = equity over total assets of banks i in time t; ∆GDP = real growth in gross domestic product in time t; UNEMP = unemployment rate in 
time t; SIZE = size of the commercial bank, represented by the natural logarithm of total assets de ated by the general market price index.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Variable Expected Behavior Sign
Earnings/Assets
Considering that banks use the provision as an earnings management tool, 
a positive variation in earnings before income tax, pro t sharing, and loan 
loss provisions should make the level of the bank’s provision increase.
+
NE
Considering that banks use the provision as a capital management 
tool, a negative variation in net equity should make the level of the 
banks’ provision increase. A bank would be likely to record a higher 
provision when its regulatory capital was below that required. 
-
Loans/Assets
Considering that a greater share of credit operations in total 
investments represents an increase in credit risk, a positive 
variation in the relationship between loans and total assets should 
make the level of commercial banks’ provisions increase.
+
Variation in loans
Considering that a positive variation in the volume of credit operations over time 
represents an increase in credit risk, a positive variation in the volume of credit 
operations should make the level of commercial banks’ provisions increase.
+
NE = net equity; GDP = gross domestic product.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Table 2 Cont.
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 e risk of multicollinearity was analyzed by applying 
the variance in ation test among the explanatory variables, 
which did not reveal multicollinearity problems.
 e Chow test was carried out to test the existence of 
individual heterogeneity and con rm whether the use of 
panel data would apply to the study. In the three countries, 
the option was to use the regression with individual e ects. 
 en the Hausman test was carried out to de ne the best 
panel data method for the regression estimation. For Brazil, 
the result indicated the random e ects model. For Spain 
and the United Kingdom, it was the  xed e ects model.
In order to analyze the existence of autocorrelation 
between the residuals of the regression, the Durbin-
Watson test was used. In the three countries, the value 
of the statistic was between dl and du, indicating that the 
test was inconclusive. Adopting a conservative position, 
the null hypothesis of the inexistence of autocorrelation 
is rejected; that is, the model residuals appear to be 
autocorrelated.
In light of the possibility of the existence of cross-sectional 
autocorrelation of the residuals, the use of the SUR cross-sectional 
standard errors method (PCSE) in the model estimation arose as 
an alternative to the problem, enabling the generation of robust 
parameters even in the presence of residues autocorrelation.
 e overall signi cance of the model was proven using 
the F test.
5.4. Sample De nition and Description of the 
Data Source
5.4.1. In relation to the banks that operate in Brazil.
In Brazil, the sample considered the institutions that 
formed part of Consolidated Banking I, formed by Banking 
Conglomerate I (composed of at least one institution of the 
Commercial Bank or Multiple Bank with Commercial Portfolio 
type) and Independent Banking Institutions I (Commercial 
Banks, Multiple Banks with Commercial Portfolio, and Savings 
Banks that do not form part of a conglomerate).
Ninety-eight institutions were initially considered. 
Together, these institutions controlled 84.1% of the total assets 
of the National Financial System on December 31st 2012.
Banco Plural, Morgan Stanley, Banco BM&F, Banco 
Opportunity, BNY Mellon, Western Union, and Banco 
Petra were excluded from the sample as they did not 
present a credit operations balance in the period analyzed.
Data was extracted from the semi-annual  nancial 
statements of the chosen institutions on June 30st and 
December 31st between 2001 and 2012, obtained from 
the Banco Central do Brasil website.
5.4.2. In relation to the banks that operate in Spain.
The sample considered all of the Spanish banks 
associated with the Asociación Española de Banca (AEB). 
Fi y-eight institutions, including  nancial conglomerates 
and individuals banks, were considered in the study.
5.4.3. In relation to the banks that operate in the United 
Kingdom.
The selection of banks that operate in the United 
Kingdom was based on the publication “List of Banks as 
Compiled by the Bank of England on 31 March 2013”, which 
covers the list of banks under the supervision of the Bank of 
England, available from the website www.bankofengland.
co.uk.  e list is comprised of 153  nancial institutions, with 
45 banks being selected to compose the sample (29.41% 
of the supervised institutions).  e sample prioritized 
institutions closing their  nancial year on December 31st and 
which presented their information in identical monetary 
bases (pounds sterling).  e information was obtained 
from the Company Check website (www.companycheck.
co.uk), which provides the annual  nancial statements of 
banks operating in the United Kingdom.
Table 5 Pearson correlation matrix – United Kingdom.
LOAN ∆lnLOAN EAR NE ∆GDP UNEMP SIZE
LOAN 1.000000 - - - - - -
∆lnLOAN 0.136788 1.000000 - - - - -
EAR 0.053496 0.026894 1.000000 - - - -
NE 0.114561 -0.055089 0.015586 1.000000 - - -
∆GDP -0.036011 0.110507 -0.035462 -0.003076 1.000000 - -
UNEMP 0.012340 -0.155514 -0.030084 0.050401 -0.607156 1.000000 -
SIZE -0.279305 0.042143 -0.041180 -0.448594 -0.060661  0.097252 1.000000
LOAN/ASS = share of credit operations in the total assets of Brazilian banks; ∆lnLOAN = variation in the balances of credit operations of banks 
i in time t; EAR = share of earnings before income tax, pro t sharing, and loan loss provisions over average total assets of the Brazilian banks; 
NE = equity over total assets of banks i in time t; ∆GDP = real growth in gross domestic product in time t; UNEMP = unemployment rate in 
time t; SIZE = size of the commercial bank, represented by the natural logarithm of total assets de ated by the general market price index.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
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6. RESULTS
6.1. Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent 
Variable
 e descriptive statistics of the dependent variable are 
found in Table 6. From the second semester of 2001 to 
the second semester of 2012, the commercial banks that 
operated in Brazil, in Spain, and in the United Kingdom 
set, on average, provisions in percentages equal to 0.83%, 
0.2668%, and 0.3607% of total assets, respectively.  e 
standard deviations show a large variability in the 
provision, perhaps caused by the reversion mechanism, 
and indicate that the frequency distributions of the 
provision in the three countries have a similar behavior.
Table 6 Descriptive statistics of the dependent variable in the model – Brazil, Spain, and the United Kingdom, from 2001 to 2012.
Provisions/Total Assets Brazil Spain United Kingdom
Mean 0.0083 0.0027 0.0036
Median 0.0044 0.0008 0.0013
Maximum Value 0.1643 0.0858 0.1432
Minimum Value -0.0519 -0.0337 -0.0407
Standard Deviation 0.0146 0.0071 0.0102
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
6.2. Descriptive Statistics of the Independent 
Variables
6.2.1. Brazil.
According to Table 7, on average only 34.34% of 
the resources were used for credit operations, a lower 
percentage than those of the banks that operate in Spain 
and the United Kingdom, which were around 82% and 
71%, respectively. 
 e average share of own resources over the total 
investments of the commercial banks has shown to be 
quite signi cant, at around 23%, and more comfortable 
than that of the banks that operate in Spain (average of 
20%) and much higher than that of the banks that operate 
in the United Kingdom (average of 13.8%).
Table 7 Descriptive statistics of the independent variables in the model – Brazil, 2001-2012.
MEASURE LOAN ∆lnLOAN NE EAR ∆GDP UNEMP SIZE
Mean 0.3434 0.1272 0.2320 0.0225 0.0167 0.0855 13.999
Median 0.3309 0.1268 0.1551 0.0184 0.0196 0.0830 13.922
Maximum Value 1.0344 5.6920 0.9999 0.3568 0.0474 0.1300 20.8069
Minimum Value 0.0000 -5.2298 -0.1038 -0.1831 -0.0279 0.0470 8.2451
Standard Deviation 0.2356 0.5020 0.2154 0.0326 0.0174 0.0222 2.3498
LOAN = share of credit operations in the total assets of the Brazilian banks; ∆lnLOAN = real growth in the balances of credit operations recorded 
in the balance sheets of the Brazilian banks; NE = share of equity over total assets of the Brazilian banks; EAR = share of earnings before income 
tax, pro t sharing, and loan loss provisions over the average total assets of the Brazilian banks; ∆GDP = real growth in the gross domestic product 
of Brazil; UNEMP = unemployment rate in Brazil; SIZE = size of the commercial bank, represented by the natural logarithm of total assets 
de ated by the general market prices index.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
6.2.2. Spain.
Table 8 presents the descriptive statistics of the 
independent variables in relation to the banks that operate 
in Spain.  e average return on assets was around 0.53%, 
below the returns of the banks that operate in Brazil 
(2.25%) and in the United Kingdom (1.91%).
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Table 8 Descriptive statistics of the independent variables in the model – Spain, 2001-2012.
MEASURE LOAN ∆lnLOAN NE EAR ∆GDP UNEMP SIZE
Mean 0.8195 0.0534 0.1998 0.0053 0.0078 0.1362 14.0939
Median 0.8793 0.0354 0.0808 0.0036 0.0140 0.1130 13.9648
Maximum Value 1.0766 8.0520 0.9999 0.3045 0.0201 0.2510 20.9620
Minimum Value 0.0000 -8.0301 -0.0315 -0.1705 -0.0278 0.0810 0.0810
Standard Deviation 0.1905 0.4701 0.2745 0.0242 0.0131 0.0527 2.4123
LOAN = share of credit operations in the total assets of the Spanish banks; ∆lnLOAN = real growth in the balances of credit operations recorded 
in the balance sheets of the Spanish banks; NE = share of equity over total assets of the Spanish banks; EAR = share of earnings before income 
tax, pro t sharing, and loan loss provision over the average total assets of the Spanish banks; ∆GDP = real growth in the gross domestic product 
of Spain; UNEMP = unemployment rate in Spain; SIZE = size of the commercial bank, represented by the natural logarithm of total assets 
de ated by the general market price index.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
6.2.3. United Kingdom.
 e descriptive statistics of the independent variables related to the banks that operate in the United Kingdom 
are presented in Table 9.
Table 9 Descriptive statistics of the independent variables in the model – United Kingdom, 2001-2012.
MEASURE LOAN ∆lnLOAN NE EAR ∆GDP UNEMP SIZE
Mean 0.7076 0.1129 0.1380 0.0191 0.0150 0.0600 13.2893
Median 0.7453 0.0900 0.0935 0.0086 0.0224 0.0533 12.8845
Maximum Value 1.3041 6.5087 0.9885 5.5899 0.0395 0.0807 20.6667
Minimum Value 0.0000 -2.0549 0.0000 -0.1625 -0.0517 0.0467 3.98689
Standard Deviation 0.2353 0.4501 0.1439 0.2472 0.0242 0.0140 2.65957
LOAN = share of credit operations in the total assets of the British banks; ∆lnLOAN = real growth in the balances of credit 
operations recorded in the balance sheets of the British banks; NE = share of equity over total assets of the British banks; EAR 
= share of earnings before income tax, pro t sharing, and loan loss provisions over the average total assets of the British banks; 
∆GDP = real growth in the gross domestic product of the United Kingdom; UNEMP = unemployment rate in the United 
Kingdom; SIZE = size of the commercial bank, represented by the natural logarithm of total assets de ated by the general market 
price index.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
6.3. Test of the Hypotheses
6.3.1. H1: Banks that operate in the United Kingdom
 e coe  cient of determination (R2) indicates that the 
independent variables are associated with 38.87% of the 
behavior of the dependent variable.  e F statistic, with 
a p-value of 0.0000, con rms the statistical signi cance 
of the model (Table 10).
Table 10 Coef cients of Determination and F Statistic of the model – United Kingdom.
Variables Value
R2 0.3887
R2 Adjusted 0.3191
F Statistic 5.5863
P-Value (F) 0.0000
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
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Table 11 Regression results – United Kingdom.
Variable Coef cient Standard deviation T statistic Prob.
C 0.0114 0.0074 1.5429 0.1236
LOAN -0.0009 0.0023 -0.3715 0.7105
∆lnLOAN -0.0006 0.0019 -0.3013 0.7633
EAR -0.0022 0.0053 -0.4124 0.6803
NE -0.0052 0.0072 -0.7189 0.4726
∆GDP -0.0553 0.0140 -3.9372 0.0001
UNEMP 0.0505 0.0270 1.8662 0.0627
SIZE -0.0007 0.0005 -1.2307 0.2191
C = constant in the regression; LOAN = balances of credit operations of banks i in time t; ∆lnLOAN = variation in the balances of credit 
operations of banks i in time t; EAR = earnings before income tax, pro t sharing, and loan loss provisions over the average total assets of banks i 
in time t; NE = equity over the total assets of banks i in time t; ∆GDP = real growth of gross domestic product in time t; UNEMP = unemployment 
rate in time t; SIZE = size of banks i in time t.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Table 12 Coef cients of determination and F statistic of the model – Spain.
Variables Value
R2 0.3831
R2 Adjusted 0.3436
F Statistic 9.7147
P-Value (F) 0.0000
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
The macroeconomic variables and the specific 
accounting variables of the banks, except GDP, do not 
have signi cant e ects on the provision in the United 
Kingdom.  e “loans over total assets” and “growth in 
lending” variables were not found to be signi cant, thus 
going against the expectations presented in Table 2.
 e “earnings before income tax, pro t sharing, and 
loan loss provisions over total assets” variable was also 
not found to be signi cant, indicating that variations in 
earnings would not explain the behavior of the provision 
and going against the expectations of the research. 
Earnings management via provisions does not appear 
to be a common practice among banks in the United 
Kingdom.
 e “net equity over total assets” variable was not 
found to be signi cant, thus going against the capital 
management hypothesis.
At a 1% level of signi cance, the coe  cient of the “GDP 
growth” variable was found to be signi cantly negative, 
indicating pro-cyclical behavior of the banks in the United 
Kingdom, in line with hypothesis H1.
 e “unemployment rate growth” variable was only 
found to be signi cant at a 10% level of signi cance, 
thus going against the expectations.  is result, however, 
supports the  ndings of previous studies, such as Bikkers 
and Metzemakers (2004).
 e “size” control variable was also not found to be 
signi cant.
6.3.2. H2: Banks that operate in Spain.
With regards to the banks that operate in Spain, 
the coe  cient of determination (R2) indicates that the 
independent variables are associated with 38.31% of 
the dependent variable behavior.  e F statistic, with a 
p-value of 0.0000, con rms the statistical signi cance of 
the model (Table 12).
 e “loans over total assets”, “earnings over total assets”, 
“GDP growth” and “size” variables have signi cant e ects 
on loan loss provisions in Spain, at di erent levels of 
signi cance, as can be observed in Table 13.  e other 
variables were not signi cant.
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Table 13 Regression results – Spain.
Variable Coef cient Standard deviation t-statistic Prob.
C -0.0149 0.0074 -2.0191 0.0438
LOAN 0.0031 0.0017 1.8418 0.0658
∆lnLOAN -0.0004 0.0003 -1.2059 0.2281
EAR -0.1004 0.0170 -5.9089 0.0000
NE -0.0020 0.0052 -0.3825 0.7022
∆GDP -0.0534 0.0192 -2.7727 0.0057
UNEMP 0.0040 0.0049 0.8224 0.4111
SIZE 0.0011 0.0004 2.5368 0.0113
C = constant in the regression; LOAN = balances of credit operations of banks i in time t; ∆lnLOAN = variation in the balances of credit 
operations of banks i in time t; EAR = earnings before income tax, pro t sharing, and loan loss provisions over the average total assets of banks i 
in time t; NE = equity over the total assets of banks i in time t; ∆GDP = real growth of gross domestic product in time t; UNEMP = unemployment 
rate in time t; SIZE = size of banks i in time t.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
 e “loans over total assets” variable was not found to 
be signi cant, at a 10% level of signi cance.  e positive 
sign of the coe  cient supports the expectation presented 
in Table 2, indicating that the provision tends to rise when 
the share of loans over total assets increases.
Contrary to expectations, the “growth in lending” 
variable was not found to be signi cant, indicating that 
the variation in the volume of lending does not explain 
the behavior of the provisions.
The “earnings before income tax, profit sharing, 
and loan loss provisions over total assets” variable was 
not found to be signi cant in Spain, at a 1% level of 
signi cance.  e negative sign of the coe  cient indicates 
growth of the provision whenever earnings decrease and 
vice-versa, thus going against expectations.  ere is no 
evidence of earnings management practices via provisions 
in the Spanish banks.
The “net equity over total assets” variable is not 
signi cant, thus going against the expectation with regards 
to the use of the provision for earnings management.
Contrary to the expectation of hypothesis H2, at a 1% 
level of signi cance the coe  cient of the “GDP growth” 
variable was found to be signi cantly negative, indicating 
pro-cyclical behavior.     
 e “unemployment rate” variable was not found 
to be signi cant, going against expectations.  e “size” 
control variable was found to be signi cant, with a positive 
sign, indicating that the larger the bank, the higher the 
provision tends to be.
6.3.3. H3: Banks that operate in Brazil.
 e coe  cient of determination (R2) indicates that the 
independent variables of the model are associated with 
15.65% of the dependent variable behavior (Table 14). 
 e F statistic, which presents a p-value equal to 0.0000, 
con rms the statistical signi cance of the model.
Table 14 Coef cients of determination and F statistic of the model – Brazil.
Variables Value
R2 0.1565
R2 Adjusted 0.1531
F Statistic 45.1995
P-Value (F) 0.0000
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
According to the data in Table 15, the macroeconomic 
variables and the speci c accounting variables of the banks 
studied in Brazil, with the exception of the unemployment 
rate and size, have signi cant e ects on the provision.
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Table 15 Regression results – Brazil.
Variable Coef cient Standard deviation t-statistic Prob
C -0.0086 0.0080 -1.0795 0.2805
LOAN 0.0268 0.0026 10.4186 0.0000
∆lnLOAN -0.0014 0.0007 -1.8981 0.0579
EAR 0.0868 0.0170 5.1125 0.0000
NE 0.0138 0.0045 3.0866 0.0021
∆GDP -0.0477 0.0186 -2.5637 0.0104
UNEMP -0.0173 0.0185 -0.9356 0.3496
SIZE 0.0004 0.0004 0.9305 0.3523
C = constant in the regression; LOAN = balances of credit operations of banks i in time t; ∆lnLOAN = variation in the balances of credit 
operations of banks i in time t; EAR = earnings before income tax, pro t sharing, and loan loss provisions over the average total assets of banks i 
in time t; NE = equity over the total assets of banks i in time t; ∆GDP = real growth of gross domestic product in time t; UNEMP = unemployment 
rate in time t; SIZE = size of banks i in time t.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
 e “loans over total assets” variable was found to 
be signi cant at a 1% level of signi cance. As expected, 
when a bank increases its share of credit operations in 
total investments, the percentage of the provision also 
increases, con rming the claim of growth in risks in 
phases of economic expansion.  is prudent behavior of 
the banks contributes to attenuating the e ects caused 
by possible pro-cyclical behaviors.
 e “growth in lending” variable was only found 
to be significant at a 10% level of significance. The 
coe  cient presented a negative sign, indicating that the 
provisions usually decrease when the balance of credit 
operations increases.  is  nding would go against the 
initial expectation, which indicated a probable positive 
relationship between growth in the lending volume and 
the provision. 
 e “earnings before income tax, pro t sharing, and 
loan loss provisions over total assets” variable was also 
found to be signi cant at a 1% level of signi cance, 
indicating that variations in earnings are related with 
the behavior of the provision.  e positive sign of the 
coe  cient indicates growth in provision levels whenever 
earnings increase and vice-versa, thus supporting the 
expectation presented in Table 2.  e result indicates the 
use of the provision for earnings management, a practice 
which ameliorates the pro-cyclical e ects of the provision.
 e “net equity over total assets” variable was shown 
to be signi cant at a 1% level of signi cance.  e negative 
sign of the coe  cient would go against the expectation of 
use of the provision for capital management; it is supposed 
that the banks raise the provision whenever their capital 
levels are more comfortable. It is assumed that the fact that 
the banks in Brazil have historically presented a higher 
reference equity than that required by the Central Bank 
and the absence itself of the generic provision instrument 
in the country’s regulation explain this result.
Regarding hypothesis H3, at a 1% level of signi cance 
the coe  cient of the “GDP growth” variable was shown to 
be signi cantly negative, indicating pro-cyclical behavior. 
 is appears to indicate the absence of an e  cient risk 
evaluation mechanism with a forward-looking character.
With regards to the “growth in the unemployment 
rate” variable, this was not found to be signi cant, thus 
going against the expectation presented in Table 2.  e 
same occurs with the “size” control variable. It cannot be 
claimed that larger banks in Brazil, or those belonging to 
conglomerates, set more robust provisions than the rest.
As a sensitivity analysis, the lagged GDP and 
unemployment rate variables were added to the models. 
In Brazil and the United Kingdom, these variables were 
not found to be signi cant, indicating that the e ect 
of their behavior on the provision calculation occurs 
in the same accounting period. With regards to Spain, 
the unemployment rate variable was not found to be 
significant, but the GDP variable was shown to be 
signi cant at a 1% level of signi cance. 
7. FINAL REMARKS
Studies such as those by Bikker and Hu (2002), Laeven 
and Majnoni (2003), and Bikker and Metzemakers (2004) 
reveal that the choice between di erent accounting models 
would determine the behavior of the provision with 
relation to the business cycles.  e expectation is that 
the incurred loss model leads to pro-cyclical behavior 
of the provision and the expected loss model results in 
countercyclical behavior of the provision.  is study 
proposed to investigate whether the incurred loss models, 
which are conceptually pro-cyclical, would lead banks to 
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setting pro-cyclical provisions, and whether the expected 
loss models, which are conceptually countercyclical, would 
lead banks to recognizing countercyclical provisions. 
Two countries were intentionally chosen to represent 
these accounting models: Spain (expected loss) and 
the United Kingdom (incurred loss). A mixed model 
adopted in Brazil was also analyzed.  e prevalence of 
typical procedures of expected loss models reinforced 
the hypothesis that the Brazilian model would be 
countercyclical.
Based on the linear regression models used in previous 
studies, especially those by Cavallo and Majnoni (2001), 
Bikker and Hu (2002), Laeven and Majnoni (2003), and 
Bikker and Metzemakers (2004), variables were selected 
to compose an econometric model that identi ed the 
relationship between the provision and the economic 
cycles in the three countries selected.
Two variables were inserted into the model in order 
to identify the relationship between the provision 
and economic cycles: the real variation in GDP and 
the unemployment rate. Contrary to expected, the 
unemployment rate was not found to be statistically 
signi cant in Brazil or in Spain. In United Kingdom this 
variable was found to be signi cant, at a 10% signi cance 
level, presenting a positive coe  cient, which indicates that 
the provision tends to grow when the unemployment rate 
increases. It bears mentioning that studies such as those 
by Bikker and Metzemakers (2004) have already revealed 
that the unemployment rate would not be the best proxy 
to evaluate the relationship between the provision and 
economic cycles, a fact that is supported by this study.
 e variable unanimously taken in the studies involving 
cyclicality is the variation in GDP.  e  ndings of this 
research are consistent with these studies, as GDP was 
also found to be a statistically signi cant variable at a 
level of signi cance of practically 1% for each accounting 
model that was the object of this research.
With regards to the sign of the coe  cient of the variable 
that re ects GDP, two of the formulated hypotheses were 
not supported.  e biggest surprise was in Spain, whose 
accounting model prescribes setting forward-looking 
provisions, including provisions of a generic nature, 
which should cause countercyclical provisions.  e sign 
of the coe  cient of the variable, which would presumably 
be positive, was found to be negative, indicating pro-
cyclicality. In Brazil, despite the general rule being to set 
forward-looking provisions, and although backward-
looking previsions ultimately prevail when the delays in 
the payments of principal and interest are present, the 
study also revealed pro-cyclical behavior. It is inferred 
that the subjective character of the provision and the 
di  culty itself of predicting future economic scenarios, 
among other factors, could be leading to provisions of a 
di erent nature from that which the legislator intended 
when establishing more speci c criteria for setting them. 
Only in relation to the United Kingdom was the hypothesis 
con rmed that the accounting model adopted, based 
essentially on the IASB rules, has in fact caused provisions 
that are pro-cyclical in nature.
Also in relation to the United Kingdom, only the GDP 
growth variable was found to be signi cant, at a 5% level of 
signi cance. It is assumed that the variables that represent 
credit risk, such as “loans over total assets” and “growth 
in lending” were not found to be signi cant due to the 
characteristics of the accounting model itself adopted in 
that country, which only recognizes the provision when 
objective evidence of loss is identi ed.  us, the impact 
of the two variables would only occur indirectly (a greater 
share of loans over assets or growth in the volume of 
lending can lead to a higher probability of occurrence of 
objective evidence of loss in the future).  ese variables 
can, therefore, change without the banks in the United 
Kingdom having adjusted their provisions. In the United 
Kingdom, there was also no evidence found that the banks 
are using the provision for earnings management, thus 
contradicting the study by Silva (2016), or for capital 
management. 
With regards to earnings management, this is 
assumed to be a reality for commercial banks in Brazil, 
thus supporting the results of the studies by Macedo 
and Kelly (2016), Bortoluzzo, Sheng, and Gomes (2016), 
and Silva (2016).  e “earnings before income tax, pro t 
sharing, and loan loss provisions” variable was found to be 
signi cant, at a 1% level of signi cance, having presented 
a positive coe  cient indicating that the provision tends 
to grow when the banks’ earnings increase. In relation to 
Spain, despite the signi cance at a 1% level of signi cance, 
this variable presented a negative sign, signaling that the 
provision decreases when earnings increase and thus 
contradicting the study by Silva (2016).
Earnings management practices, which are 
reprehensible in some aspects, can represent a counterpoint 
to setting pro-cyclical provisions, easing their e ects on 
the current phase of the business cycle.
Capital management practices were also not found to 
be a reality for the commercial banks in Brazil and Spain. 
In Brazil, despite the signi cance at a level of 1%, the 
aforementioned variable presented a positive coe  cient, 
indicating that the greater the share of net equity over total 
assets, the greater the provision set by commercial banks. 
 is situation may be indicating that the comfortable level 
of capitalization presented by the banks in Brazil (23.20% 
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of total assets, on average) is inducing an increase in the 
provision level whenever net equity presents a positive 
variation, which represents a conservative procedure 
that also serves as a counterpoint to setting pro-cyclical 
provisions. In Spain, the “net equity over total assets” 
variable was not found to be signi cant, indicating that 
the provision level is not a ected by the behavior of the 
equity of commercial banks that operate in that country.
The “size” variable was found to be statistically 
signi cant only in relation to the banks that operate in 
Spain. In the other countries, the size of the banks does 
not appear to in uence the provision level. 
 e results support the previous studies by Bikker 
and Hu (2002), Laeven and Majnoni (2003), and Bikker 
and Metzemakers (2004), in the sense that the provision 
behavior strongly depends on the economic cycle, 
indicating that the provision generally grows in poor 
economic times. Another similarity between the results of 
this research and the aforementioned studies is the  nding 
that the e ect of pro-cyclicality is usually mitigated by an 
increase in the provision in periods of higher earnings 
(earnings management practices).
A possible assumption regarding the fact that 
the research revealed pro-cyclical behavior when 
countercyclical behavior was expected is that the banks 
may be using discretion and managing their earnings 
via the provision and more than compensating for the 
expected e ect of the models, which is a hypothesis to 
be investigated in future studies.
It was also found that in Brazil and the United Kingdom 
the e ect of economic variations on the provision behavior 
takes place in the same accounting period. In the case of 
Spain, however, a variation in GDP in the previous period 
was found to be a signi cant variable. 
With relation to the econometric model chosen for 
the research, it was found that the peculiar nature of 
the provision rules in the United Kingdom, in relation 
to those in Brazil and Spain, may be determining the 
di erence in the levels of signi cance of the explanatory 
variables for the model, when this is applied to commercial 
banks in the country that adopts the IASB accounting 
standards.  us, it is assumed that adaptations are needed 
to adjust the model used to the speci cities of countries 
that use relatively di erent accounting rules for setting 
the provision.
As an intentional sample is concerned, which considers 
only one country for each accounting model, the results 
may not be generalized. For future research, studies with 
di erent econometric models are suggested, incorporating 
variables not considered in this research, especially 
those related to the delay in the payment of principal 
and interest and to the accounting recognition of losses. 
Evaluating the question of cyclicality by considering 
di erent accounting scenarios in the same country (for 
example, studying cyclicality before and a er the advent 
of Resolution n. 2,682/1999) could also prove to be an 
interesting experiment for re ecting on the provision 
behavior in di erent regulatory environments.
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